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INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, residents of the Lago Agrio region of the Ecuadorian Amazon 
sued Texaco, Inc. alleging extensive environmental damage and personal 
injuries caused by Texaco’s oil extraction operations there.1  The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the suit on forum non 
conveniens grounds in favor of the courts of Ecuador, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in 2002.2  Meanwhile, Chevron Corp. 
had acquired Texaco in 2001.3 After the forum non conveniens dismissal, the 
Lago Agrio plaintiffs sued Chevron in an Ecuadorian court, which entered a 
$17.2 billion judgment against Chevron.4  Since then, the parties have been 
 
∗ Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine School of Law.  
This Essay is based on the author’s remarks at the Stanford Journal of Complex Litigation 
Symposium on Lessons from the Chevron Ecuador Litigation, Stanford Law School, 
February 8, 2013.  The author thanks the organizers for the opportunity to participate. 
 1.  Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 4.  Id. at 235-36. 
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engaged in an extensive litigation and public relations battle over the 
enforcement of the judgment, a battle that has reached beyond the United States 
and Ecuador to countries including Argentina, Brazil and Canada.  According 
to the Second Circuit, this story of conflict “must be among the most 
extensively told [stories] in the history of the American federal judiciary.”5 
Although the Chevron-Ecuador case raises many interesting legal issues, 
this Essay sounds a note of caution about the lessons of the case for 
transnational litigation.  On the one hand, the case usefully highlights two 
important transnational litigation trends: the growing multipolarity of 
transnational litigation, and the increasing interaction between the transnational 
litigation system and other international legal sub-systems.  Part One argues 
that in this modest sense, there are significant lessons to be learned from the 
Chevron-Ecuador case. 
On the other hand, I argue in Part Two that the lessons of the Chevron-
Ecuador case for law reform are, and should be, limited.  Given the case’s high 
visibility and dramatic facts, judges, scholars and policymakers may be tempted 
to draw lessons about how the rules governing transnational litigation should be 
changed.  However, the Chevron-Ecuador case is not representative of 
transnational litigation in general, and therefore does not by itself provide an 
adequate basis for reform.  Legal decisionmakers—including judges—may 
understandably feel pressure to push the law in a particular direction in order to 
address perceived imperatives that are specific to the Chevron-Ecuador case.  
But this would risk bypassing the careful evidence-based policy deliberation 
needed for sound law reform.  Part Two illustrates this risk using examples 
from the law governing the enforcement of foreign country judgments.  The 
overarching argument is this: Judges, policymakers and scholars should use 
caution to avoid unduly “Chevronizing” the law of transnational litigation. 
I. LESSONS ABOUT THE TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION SYSTEM 
A. The New Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation 
It is widely believed that the transnational litigation system is centered 
around the United States, perhaps along with the United Kingdom.6  From this 
perspective, the system appears unipolar or bipolar, with the United States and 
the United Kingdom acting as the leading providers of courts and law for 
transnational litigation.7 
However, as Marcus Quintanilla and I have argued, transnational litigation 
 
 5.  Id. at 234. 
 6.  See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in 
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. 
INT’L L. 31, 31 (2011) (documenting this conventional wisdom). 
 7.  Id. 
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is increasingly multipolar.8  The new multipolarity manifests itself in three 
ways.  First, U.S. courts are no longer as attractive to litigants as they 
supposedly once were.9  Meanwhile, other countries are increasingly drawing 
litigants to their courts through a combination of ex ante forum selection 
agreements, and ex post forum shopping.10  Lord Denning famously quipped 
that “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United 
States.”11  However, both empirical trends and anecdotal evidence from 
practitioners of transnational litigation suggest that the light may not be burning 
as brightly as it once did.12  Doctrinally, this is not surprising.  Over the years, 
the Supreme Court has reinvigorated the forum non conveniens doctrine as an 
anti-forum-shopping device,13 restricted personal jurisdiction in transnational 
suits,14 limited the extraterritorial application of U.S. statutes,15 and imposed 
stricter pleading standards, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to gain access 
to one of the major attractions of the U.S. legal system: liberal discovery.16 
Second, litigants are likely to bring a growing number of foreign country 
judgments to U.S. courts for recognition or enforcement.17  Transnational 
litigation experts have identified this trend,18 and preliminary empirical 
evidence tends to confirm it.19  This aspect of the new multipolarity follows 
from the first: if there is more litigation in foreign courts, there will be more 
foreign judgments, and when those judgments involve U.S.-based defendants or 
other defendants with significant assets in the United States, judgment creditors 
may seek enforcement in the United States.20 
 
 8.  Id. at 32. 
 9.  Id. at 33 
 10.  Id. at 33-34. 
 11.  Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (C.A. 1982). 
 12.  See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 6, at 32-35 (summarizing evidence of 
decreased transnational litigation in U.S. courts and increased transnational litigation in 
foreign courts).  See generally Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping 
System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011) (presenting evidence that alienage suits in the U.S. 
district courts declined since the 1980s, and presenting possible doctrinal and strategic 
explanations for that decline). 
 13.  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).  See Donald Earl Childress III, 
When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1564 (2011) (noting increase in 
forum non conveniens motions). 
 14.  J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 15.  Morrison v Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 16.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009). 
 17.  Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 6, at 35-37. 
 18.  See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION 
IN UNITED STATES COURTS 1078 (4th ed. 2007) (noting growth of foreign judgment 
enforcement actions in U.S. courts). 
 19.  See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 6, at 36-37. 
 20.  See id. (presenting data indicating increase in opinions involving foreign 
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Third, for those transnational suits that are litigated in U.S. courts, it is 
increasingly likely that lawyers and judges will encounter issues of foreign 
law.21  Legal scholars have already noted this trend.22  Moreover, recent 
empirical studies suggest that U.S. judges are ready to apply foreign law when 
choice-of-law methods call for it,23 and in at least one federal district there is a 
growing number of references to Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is the rule that governs determination of foreign law.24 
The Chevron-Ecuador case is a vivid illustration of multipolarity in 
transnational litigation.  Although the case was initially filed in the United 
States, it was dismissed in favor of the courts of Ecuador based on the forum 
non conveniens doctrine.25  The case was then litigated in Ecuador, resulting in 
a multi-billion dollar judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (the “Lago Agrio 
judgment”).26  Thus, the case illustrates both the growing importance of non-
U.S. forums for transnational litigation, and one likely explanation for this 
trend: the application by U.S. courts of doctrines that limit U.S. court access in 
transnational suits.  The Ecuadorian judgment is now being litigated in U.S. 
courts.27  So far, the judgment creditors have not sought enforcement of the 
judgment against Chevron’s assets in the United States, but extensive litigation 
in courts across the country has focused on matters relating to the judgment.28  
In that litigation, U.S. lawyers and judges are facing questions of Ecuadorian 
law and procedure.29  Beyond Ecuadorian and U.S. proceedings, actions to 
enforce the Ecuadorian judgment have been filed in Argentina, Brazil and 
Canada.30  Thus, even if the Chevron-Ecuador case is atypical in many ways, it 
 
judgments in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York). 
 21.  Id. at 37. 
 22.  See generally Louise Ellen Teitz, From the Courthouse in Tobago to the Internet: 
The Increasing Need to Prove Foreign Law in US Courts, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 97 (2003) 
(extensively discussing this trend). 
 23.  See Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in 
Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 765 (2009) (empirical analysis suggesting that judges are not 
biased in favor of domestic law). 
 24.  See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 6, at 38-39 (presenting this data). 
 25.  See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2012) (providing 
overview of the proceedings). 
 26.  Id. at 236. 
 27.  See id. at 234 (reversing district court’s decision to grant injunction against 
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment). 
 28.  See id. at 236 (describing “dozens of discovery proceedings” launched by Chevron 
“throughout the United States” resulting in “at least fifty orders and opinions from federal 
courts across the country”). 
 29.  See, e.g., id. at 237 (providing overview of proceedings leading to the Lago Agrio 
judgment and review of the judgment in appellate proceedings in Ecuador, and addressing 
issues of Ecuadorian law). 
 30.  Jude Webber, Chevron Loses Environment Case Appeal, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2013, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c55d8f38-6b1b-11e2-8017-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2NdiTahES. 
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illustrates—quite dramatically—the new multipolarity in transnational 
litigation. 
B. Increasing Interactions Between the Transnational Litigation System 
and Other International Legal Subsystems 
Beyond growing multipolarity, the Chevron-Ecuador case highlights 
another trend, albeit one that is not yet as well documented: increasing 
interactions between the transnational litigation system on the one hand, and 
other international legal subsystems on the other hand.  For example, in 
September 2009, Chevron initiated arbitration against the Republic of Ecuador 
pursuant to the bilateral investment treaty between Ecuador and the United 
States (the “BIT”).31  Among other things, Chevron is seeking an award 
requiring Ecuador to inform the court in the Ecuadorian proceedings that 
Chevron has been released from liability and that Ecuador or Petroecuador is 
“exclusively liable for any judgment that may be issued in the Lago Agrio 
Litigation.”32 The arbitral tribunal has issued interim awards ordering Ecuador 
“to take all measures to suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement and 
recognition within and without Ecuador” of the Lago Agrio judgment.33 
In response to the developments in the BIT arbitration proceedings, the 
Lago Agrio plaintiffs filed a request for precautionary measures in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in February 2012, aiming to prevent 
Ecuador from taking steps that would impair the plaintiffs’ rights as judgment 
creditors with respect to the Lago Agrio judgment.34  Specifically, they 
requested the Commission “to call for precautionary measures from [Ecuador] 
sufficient to assure the Commission that [Ecuador] will refrain from taking any 
action that would contravene, undermine, or threaten the human rights [of the 
plaintiffs] and that to the contrary [Ecuador] will take all appropriate measures 
to assure the full protection and continued guarantee of those rights.”35  The 
petition has since been withdrawn.36  However, there was for a moment a 
possibility that Ecuador would be subject to conflicting orders: a BIT tribunal 
 
 31.  Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petrol. Co. v. 
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/EcuadorBITEn.pdf. 
 32.  Id. at 18. 
 33.  Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petrol. Co. 
v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, at 25-26 (Feb. 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.asil.org/ilib130215.cfm#j2. 
 34.  Letter from Pablo Fajardo, Julio Prieto, Juan Pablo Saenz and Aaron Marr Page to 
Dr. Santiago Cantón, Exec. Sec’y, Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Org. of Am. States 
(Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://lettersblogatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/OAS-
Petition.pdf. 
 35.  Id. at 2. 
 36.  Lucinda Low, Remarks, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 419, 421 (2013). 
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order to prevent enforcement and a human rights commission order to protect 
the plaintiffs’ rights with respect to the judgment.37 
The Chevron-Ecuador case also implicates the international trade system.  
In September 2012, Chevron filed a petition with the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative requesting the withdrawal or suspension of certain 
trade preferences enjoyed by Ecuador under U.S. law.38  The petition is based 
on Ecuador’s purported refusal to abide by the BIT tribunal’s interim orders 
regarding the Lago Agrio judgment.39  Ecuador responded with its own filing, 
arguing that the Ecuadorian government has complied with the orders but that it 
has “no power to order the courts to interfere in private-party litigation 
[between the Lago Agrio plaintiffs and Ecuador] any more than the 
Government of the United States can order its courts to do so . . . .”40 
Thus, the Chevron-Ecuador case highlights how disputants may use 
different international legal subsystems strategically to further their objectives 
when those objectives are frustrated in domestic forums.41  In addition to the 
transnational litigation system and the national legal systems of Argentina, 
Brazil, Canada, Ecuador and the United States, the investor-state arbitration 
system, a regional human rights system, and the international trade system have 
been involved.  There is not enough evidence to establish whether this type of 
intersystemic interaction is a major trend in transnational dispute resolution.  
However, given the proliferation of regional dispute resolution systems, such a 
trend would not be surprising.  Insofar as the growth of these systems leads to 
fragmentation of international law and procedure, as some have argued,42 this 
trend is likely to increase the complexity of transnational dispute resolution 
considerably—complexity that transnational litigators will have to grow 
accustomed to. 
 
 37.  See Christopher A. Whytock, The Chevron-Ecuador Case: Three Dimensions of 
Complexity in Transnational Dispute Resolution, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 425, 426 
(2013) (“Strikingly, Chevron is using the investor-state arbitration system to get Ecuador to 
do one thing, and the plaintiffs are using a regional human rights system to get Ecuador to do 
the opposite.”). 
 38.  Letter from Edward B. Scott, Vice President and General Counsel, Chevron Corp. 
to Bennett Harman, Chairman, Andean Subcomm., Trade Pol’y Staff Comm., Office of the 
United States Trade Rep. (Sept. 17, 2012) available at http://lettersblogatory.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Chevron-comment.pdf. 
 39.  Id. at 1-2. 
 40.  Letter from Nathalie Cely, Ambassador of the Republic of Ecuador, Washington 
D.C., to Douglas Bell, Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. for Trade Pol’y and Econ., Office of the 
U.S. Trade Rep. (Sept. 17, 2012), at 4, available at http://lettersblogatory.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Ecuador-comments.pdf. 
 41.  Whytock, supra note 37, at 426. 
 42.  See generally Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (by Martti 
Koskenniemi) (providing overview of fragmentation of international legal system), available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf. 
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL CHANGE 
Even if the Chevron-Ecuador case usefully highlights significant 
transnational litigation trends, there are reasons to doubt that judges, 
policymakers, or scholars should draw lessons from the case for legal change.  
To develop this point, this Part focuses on four issues relating to foreign 
judgment enforcement—not to advocate particular positions, but to note issues 
that have been or may be litigated in the case, and that could have an impact on 
the development of the law even if that impact is not necessarily desirable from 
a general policy perspective: (1) the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
fraud as a defense to judgment enforcement; (2) the relationship between forum 
non conveniens and judgment enforcement; (3) systemic and case-specific 
exceptions to judgment enforcement; and (4) the use of the investor-state 
arbitration system to prevent judgment enforcement. 
First, some background: In the United States, state law generally provides 
the rules governing the enforcement of foreign judgments.  Most states—thirty-
three at last count, plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands—
have adopted legislation based on one of two uniform acts drafted and 
approved by the Uniform Law Commission: the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act, which was approved in 1962 (the “1962 Act”),43 
or the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, which 
was approved in 2005 (the “2005 Act”).44  The structure of both uniform acts is 
a general rule that a court shall recognize a foreign judgment unless an 
exception applies, followed by a list of exceptions.45  And in both uniform acts, 
there are two types of exceptions: mandatory exceptions, which, if applicable, 
bar enforcement; and discretionary exceptions, which, if applicable, permit a 
judge to deny enforcement.  The Restatement (Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations 
Law attempts to restate the common law of foreign judgment enforcement, and 
 
 43.  UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962) [hereinafter 1962 
Act].  As of January 2013, the U.S. Virgin Islands and 15 states have legislation based on the 
1962 Act: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  See 
Legislative Fact Sheet—Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, NAT’L CONF. OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet 
.aspx?title=Foreign%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act (last visited June 8, 
2013). 
 44.  UNIF. FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 Act].  As of January 2013, the District of Columbia and 18 states have 
adopted legislation based on the 2005 Act: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington.  In addition, legislation based on 
the 2005 Act has been introduced in Mississippi.  See Legislative Fact Sheet—Foreign 
Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign-
Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act (last visited June 8, 2013). 
 45.  See 1962 Act § 3; 2005 Act § 4(a). 
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it is for the most part consistent with the uniform acts.46 
A. Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Fraud 
It is generally accepted that fraud is a discretionary exception to the general 
rule of enforcement: a court may (but is not required to) decline enforcement of 
a foreign country judgment that was obtained by fraud.47  The prevailing 
understanding is that this exception applies only to extrinsic fraud, not intrinsic 
fraud.48  Extrinsic fraud is “conduct of the prevailing party that deprived the 
losing party of an adequate opportunity to present its case,” such as “when the 
plaintiff deliberately had the initiating process served on the defendant at the 
wrong address, deliberately gave the defendant wrong information as to the 
time and place of the hearing, or obtained a default judgment against the 
defendant based on a forged confession of judgment.”49  Intrinsic fraud, on the 
 
 46.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 481-82 (1987) [hereinafter Foreign Relations Restatement]. 
 47.  See 1962 Act § 4(b)(2) (“[a] foreign judgment need not be recognized if . . . the 
judgment was obtained by fraud”); 2005 Act § 4(c)(2) (“[a] court of this state need not 
recognize a foreign-country judgment if . . . the judgment was obtained by fraud that 
deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to present its case”); Foreign Relations 
Restatement § 482 (1987) (“[a] court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of 
the court of a foreign state if . . . the judgment was obtained by fraud”). See also Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 158-59 (1895) (implying exception where there is “fraud in procuring 
the judgment” or the judgment was “affected by fraud”).  The ALI’s proposed federal 
Foreign Judgments Recognition and Enforcement Act would make fraud a mandatory 
exception to enforcement.  See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
ACT: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 5(a)(v) (2006) (“[a] foreign judgment 
shall not be recognized or enforced . . . [if] the judgment was obtained by fraud that had the 
effect of depriving the party resisting recognition or enforcement of adequate opportunity to 
present its case to the court”) [hereinafter ALI Act]. 
 48.  See 2005 Act § 4 cmt. 7 (“[i]ntrinsic fraud does not provide a basis for denying 
recognition” and this is “consistent with the interpretation of the comparable provision in 
subsection 4(b)(2) of the 1962 Act by the courts, which have found that only extrinsic 
fraud . . . is sufficient under the 1962 Act”); ALI Act § 5 cmt. g (intrinsic fraud “will 
normally not defeat recognition or enforcement”); Foreign Relations Restatement § 482 cmt. 
e (noting that fraud defense traditionally was limited to “extrinsic fraud”).  Cf. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 cmt. d (1971) (noting “usual rule” that only “fraud 
which deprives the complainant of an opportunity to present adequately his claim or 
defense” will provide relief against judgment) [hereinafter Conflicts Restatement]. 
 49.  2005 Act § 4 cmt. 7.  See also ALI Act § 5 cmt. g (extrinsic fraud includes “a 
judgment obtained by default upon the basis of a false affidavit that the defendant had been 
duly served with the initiating process, or based on a forged confession of judgment”); 
Foreign Relations Restatement § 482 cmt. e (extrinsic fraud is a “fraudulent action by the 
prevailing party that deprived the losing party of adequate opportunity to present its case to 
the court”).  Cf. Conflicts Restatement § 115 cmt. d (referring to fraud that “may operate to 
deprive the complainant of an opportunity to present his claim or defense” that “may occur 
when the complainant is kept away from the trial either because he was prevented of 
learning of the action against him by the wrongful conduct of the other party or because he 
relied upon the other party’s false promise to discontinue the action or to inform him of the 
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other hand, is fraud that occurs in the foreign judicial proceeding itself, “such 
as false testimony of a witness or admission of a forged document into 
evidence during the foreign proceeding.”50 
Thus, Section 4(c)(2) of the 2005 Act provides that “[a] court of this state 
need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if . . . the judgment was 
obtained by fraud that deprived the losing party of an adequate opportunity to 
present its case.”51  As the comments to Section 4 explain, this section “limits 
the type of fraud that will serve as a ground for denying recognition to extrinsic 
fraud.”52  The fraud exception in the 1962 Act simply refers to a judgment 
“obtained by fraud,”53 but the comments to Section 4 of the 2005 Act note that 
courts interpreting the 1962 Act have found that only extrinsic fraud is 
sufficient to invoke the exception.54 
The policy behind the limitation to extrinsic fraud is that “the assertion that 
intrinsic fraud has occurred should be raised and dealt with in the rendering 
court.”55  Parties should be encouraged to raise allegations of fraud on a timely 
basis rather than waiting until judgment enforcement proceedings in another 
jurisdiction, and the rendering court that itself oversaw the proceedings should 
be able to assess claims of intrinsic fraud more accurately and efficiently than a 
distant court that has no direct knowledge of the proceedings and instead must 
rely primarily on the parties allegations in subsequent enforcement 
proceedings.  If a judgment debtor alleges intrinsic fraud, the proper procedure 
is for those allegations to be addressed to the rendering court or on appeal to a 
higher court with jurisdiction over the rendering court, and for the U.S. court to 
stay enforcement proceedings pending resolution in the rendering country’s 
 
time when the case would be called for trial, or when the complainant is induced by the fraud 
of the adverse party not to contest a fraudulent claim or defense”). 
 50.  2005 Act § 4 cmt. 7.  See also ALI Act § 5 cmt. g (judgment debtor alleges 
intrinsic fraud when it alleges “that a witness in the foreign proceeding gave false testimony 
or that a forged document was introduced in the foreign proceeding”) and reporter’s note 6 
(judgment debtor alleges intrinsic fraud when it alleges “that the rendering court acted upon 
perjured testimony or falsified documents”); Foreign Relations Restatement § 482 cmt. e 
(judgment debtor alleges intrinsic fraud when it alleges “that the judgment was based on 
perjured testimony or falsified documents”).  Cf. Conflicts Restatement § 115 cmt. d 
(referring to fraud that occurs “during the trial itself, such as when the judgment is obtained 
by false or perjured testimony, by the production of false documents or by a conspiracy 
between the successful party and the witnesses”). 
 51.  2005 Act § 4(c)(2). 
 52.  2005 Act § 4 cmt. 7. 
 53.  1962 Act § 4(b)(2). 
 54.  2005 Act § 4 cmt. 7. 
 55.  2005 Act § 4 cmt. 7.  See also ALI Act § 5 cmt. g (assertions of intrinsic fraud 
“should have been raised in the rendering court”); Foreign Relations Restatement § 482 cmt. 
e (“The distinction between extrinsic fraud for purposes of recognition of foreign judgments 
is based on the view that a challenge on grounds of intrinsic fraud should be addressed to the 
rendering court.”). 
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legal system of the allegations of fraud.56 
Most of Chevron’s allegations of fraud—as serious as they may be—would 
seem to be most fairly characterized as allegations of intrinsic fraud.  They are 
more akin to false testimony and forged documents and conspiracy between a 
party and witnesses than to depriving a party from being able to present its 
case.57  However, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments comments that this 
and other formal distinctions regarding different types of fraud are neither 
persuasive nor consistently applied.58  Moreover, some of Chevron’s 
allegations of fraud in the foreign proceedings could be framed as depriving 
Chevron of an adequate opportunity to present its case, as Chevron’s counsel 
attempted to do59—although such a framing would probably depend on a 
showing by Chevron that, notwithstanding reasonable precautions, it was 
unable to detect the fraud during the foreign proceedings and therefore was 
unable to raise objections there.60 
 
 56.  See ALI Act § 5 reporter’s note 6 (“If the foreign judgment can still be reopened or 
set aside on the basis of the assertion of fraud, the court in the United States where 
recognition or enforcement is sought should stay the action for enforcement in order to give 
the judgment debtor a reasonable opportunity to apply to the rendering court to reopen the 
original proceeding, subject in appropriate cases to the posting of security by the judgment 
debtor.”); 2005 Act § 8 (“If a party establishes that an appeal from a foreign-country 
judgment is pending or will be taken, the court may stay any proceedings with regard to the 
foreign-country judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the 
appellant has had sufficient time to prosecute the appeal and has failed to do so”); Foreign 
Relations Restatement § 482 cmt. e (“If the judgment could be set aside in the rendering 
state, the court in the United States where enforcement is sought should stay the action for 
enforcement in order to give the judgment debtor a reasonable opportunity to petition the 
rendering court to set the judgment aside, subject, in appropriate cases, to the giving of 
security.”). 
 57.  See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 636-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(summarizing Chevron’s allegations of fraud). 
 58.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 70 cmt. c (1982) (“Aside from not 
being very persuasive, these various distinctions are not consistently applied.”) [hereinafter 
Judgments Restatement].  The Judgments Restatement, however, is not directly on point.  It 
restates the law of a U.S. forum regarding its own judgments, not the law of a U.S. forum 
regarding the judgments of other jurisdictions that may have their own law governing fraud. 
 59. See, e.g., Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 62, Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 
(2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1150-cv(L)), 2011 WL 2603734 (arguing that “blackmail and 
intimidation tactics against the judge and corrupting an independent agent of the court 
charged with making crucial technical recommendations is ‘extrinsic fraud’”).  This 
malleability of allegations of fraud is one reason for the Judgments Restatement’s skepticism 
about the intrinsic/extrinsic fraud distinction.  See Judgments Restatement § 70 cmt. c 
(noting that the “distinction was obliterated by decisions in which it was reasoned that 
offering fabricated evidence ‘prevented’ the other party from contesting the proposition for 
which the fabricated evidence was offered as proof”). 
 60.  See Judgments Restatement § 70 cmt. d (to obtain relief based on allegation of 
fraud, judgment debtor must, among other things, establish that “he adequate pursued means 
for discovering the truth available to him in the original action” and “must show due 
diligence after judgment, in that he discovered the fraud as soon as might reasonably have 
been expected”). 
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This may be a relatively small legal opening.  But given the stakes and the 
seriousness of Chevron’s allegations about irregularities in the foreign 
proceedings, it would not be surprising for a U.S. judge to use this opening to 
conclude that the fraud exception should apply in this case.61  This would have 
the effect of either significantly stretching the concept of extrinsic fraud not 
only in this case but for future cases, or perhaps moving away from the 
distinction altogether, thus changing the law even more significantly.  In short, 
this is one area of the law of transnational litigation which, if litigated as 
zealously as other issues have been litigated in the case, could see some change 
in the form of a dilution of the extrinsic fraud limitation—not so much because 
of a general and well thought out rejection of the policy rationale for the 
limitation, but in order to craft a remedy that seems necessary in light of the 
facts and what is at stake in this particular case. 
Although I do not have a firm position on the issue, my intuition is that 
there are not clear and compelling policy reasons to tinker with this aspect of 
U.S. judgment enforcement doctrine and that claims of intrinsic fraud 
ordinarily should be addressed in the court most familiar with the proceedings 
in which the fraud is alleged to have occurred.  If the rendering legal system is 
incapable of doing so fairly, for example because the court is biased or 
politicized or otherwise fails to provide due process, then other exceptions to 
judgment enforcement will be available—such as the systemic due process 
exception (or, depending on the state, the case-specific due process exception 
or the corruption exception) discussed below. 
B. Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
Beyond the limited scope of the fraud exception to foreign judgment 
enforcement, Chevron faces another potential legal difficulty: Chevron argues 
that the Ecuadorian judiciary suffers from inadequacies that should preclude 
enforcement; but Texaco argued earlier that Ecuador was an adequate 
alternative forum that was more appropriate for deciding the plaintiffs’ claims 
against it than a U.S. court.62  The case began when plaintiffs sued Texaco in 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1993.63  In 
2001, Texaco successfully moved to dismiss the suit in favor of Ecuador on 
forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that the Ecuadorian legal system was 
available and adequate, and would be more appropriate than a U.S. court for 
 
 61.  In proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
Judge Kaplan appeared sympathetic to Chevron’s fraud argument, but concluded only that 
“Chevron has raised substantial questions that present a fair ground for litigation as to 
whether the Ecuadorian judgment is a result of fraud . . . .” Donziger, 768 F. Supp. at 636-
37. 
 62.  See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 235. 
 63.  Id. at 235. 
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adjudicating the dispute.64  On appeal, Texaco argued that “Ecuador provides 
plaintiffs with an adequate alternative forum,” that “Ecuador can and does 
dispense independent and impartial justice,” and that the record provided 
“practical proof that litigants can and do obtain fair treatment and relief in 
Ecuador’s courts,” including in cases arising out of the oil contamination 
alleged by plaintiffs.65  The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in 2002.66  
As one of its arguments against the enforceability of the Ecuadorian judgment, 
Chevron now argues that the Ecuadorian judiciary suffers from inadequacies 
that should preclude enforcement.67 
The Second Circuit has indicated that Chevron is bound by Texaco’s 
positions during the forum non conveniens stage of the proceedings.68  
Moreover, plaintiffs and commentators have argued that Chevron should be 
estopped from changing its position to argue at the enforcement stage that the 
Ecuadorian judiciary is inadequate.69  However, as Cassandra Burke Robertson 
and I have argued in some detail in a recent article on the relationship between 
the forum non conveniens doctrine and judgment enforcement, there are several 
reasons why such estoppel arguments are unlikely to succeed.70  First, the 
judicial adequacy standard at the forum non conveniens stage is very lenient: 
the dominant approach, and the one endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, only requires that there be some remedy 
potentially available in the foreign court and that the defendant is amendable to 
suit there.71  Defendants routinely ensure that the second requirement is 
satisfied by giving their consent to suit in the foreign court.72  Thus, this is an 
easy standard to satisfy.  At the enforcement stage, on the other hand, the 
 
 64.  Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 65.  Appellee’s Brief at 54-56, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2001) 
(No. 2001-7756). 
 66.  Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 473 (“We modify the judgments in one respect . . . but 
otherwise affirm the dismissal of the actions by reason of forum non conveniens.”). 
 67.  See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting 
Chevron’s argument that “the Ecuadorian judgment in this case ‘was rendered under a 
system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law’”). 
 68.  See Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 389-90 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting Chevron’s argument “that it is not bound by the promises made by its predecessors 
in interest Texaco and ChevronTexaco, Inc.,” and concluding that Texaco’s promises at the 
forum non conveniens stage are “enforceable against Chevron in this action and any future 
proceedings between the parties, including enforcement actions, contempt proceedings, and 
attempts to confirm arbitral awards”). 
 69.  Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 648. 
 70.  Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens 
and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444 (2011).  Indeed, the 
argument has already been rejected by the Southern District of New York. Donziger, 768 F. 
Supp. 2d at 648-49. 
 71.  Whytock & Robertson, supra note 70, at 1472-74. 
 72.  Id. 
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foreign judicial system must satisfy a stricter standard: it must “provide 
impartial tribunals” and “procedures compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law”—otherwise, a U.S. court may not enforce a judgment produced 
by that system.73  Therefore, an argument that a judicial system is adequate for 
forum non conveniens dismissal purposes is not necessarily inconsistent with 
an argument that the same judicial system is inadequate for enforcement 
purposes.74  Second, the assertion that the Ecuadorian legal system was 
inadequate at the time of the proceedings leading to the Lago Agrio judgment is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the claim that it was adequate at the time of 
the forum non conveniens dismissal in 2001, because the conditions in Ecuador 
may have changed.75 
As Professor Robertson and I argue in our article, the problem is that this 
mismatch of foreign judicial adequacy standards may in some cases produce an 
access-to-justice gap.  Access to justice requires not only court access, but also 
a potential remedy.  But if the forum non conveniens doctrine is applied to 
deny the plaintiff court access in one forum and, in the same dispute, the 
judgment enforcement doctrine is applied to deny the plaintiff a remedy based 
on a judgment from another forum, the plaintiff may be denied meaningful 
access to justice.76  We therefore propose a variety of doctrinal changes to 
reduce the likelihood of this sort of access-to-justice gap.77 
However, the Chevron-Ecuador case probably does not present a good 
opportunity to undertake such a project.  If, as Chevron alleges, plaintiffs’ 
counsel actively promoted and took advantage of corruption in the Ecuadorian 
judiciary, it would seem unfair to limit Chevron’s ability to pursue defenses 
against enforcement based on those allegations simply because Texaco earlier 
argued that the Ecuadorian system was adequate.  Moreover, because under 
existing law claims of foreign judicial adequacy at the forum non conveniens 
stage are not necessarily inconsistent with claims of foreign judicial inadequacy 
at the enforcement stage, it would seem unfair to apply our proposals 
retroactively in this case.78 
 
 73.  2005 Act § 4(b)(1). 
 74.  Whytock & Robertson, supra note 70, at 1501-02.  However, Texaco may have 
argued more than it had to under the prevailing forum non conveniens standard, and to the 
extent it argued that Ecuador provided impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law, Chevron might find it more difficult to escape estoppel 
based on differences between the two foreign judicial adequacy standards. 
 75.  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has rejected 
plaintiffs’ estoppel argument for this reason. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 648-49 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 76.  Whytock & Robertson, supra note 70, at 1450. 
 77.  See id. at pt. III (setting forth the proposals). 
 78.  See id. at 1514 (recommending that “the proposed standards be applied only 
prospectively” so that they are in place at the forum non conveniens dismissal stage). 
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C. Case-Specific Versus Systemic Due Process Exceptions 
Interactions with the forum non conveniens doctrine aside, it is widely 
accepted that there is a mandatory systemic due process exception to foreign 
judgment enforcement.  For example, Section 4(b)(1) of the 2005 Act provides 
that “[a] court of this state may not recognize a foreign-country judgment if . . . 
the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due 
process of law.”79  As the comments to the 2005 Act explain, “[t]he focus of 
inquiry is not whether the procedure in the rendering country is similar to U.S. 
procedure, but rather on the basic fairness of the foreign-country procedure.”80  
This exception “requires the forum court to deny recognition to the foreign-
country judgment if the forum court finds that the entire judicial system in the 
foreign country where the foreign-country judgment was rendered does not 
provide procedures compatible with the requirements of fundamental 
fairness”—in other words, it focuses on “the foreign country’s judicial system 
as a whole.”81  Traditionally, the failure of due process in a particular case has 
not been sufficient to establish an exception.82 
This traditional limitation is based on the pro-enforcement policy of U.S. 
judgment enforcement law.  For example, the American Law Institute rejected 
a case-specific due process exception, explaining that “[s]uch a detailed inquiry 
into the foreign judgment is inconsistent with the pro-enforcement philosophy 
of this Act.”83  Similarly, as the Seventh Circuit has argued, a case-specific 
approach would be “inconsistent with providing a streamlined, expeditious 
method for collecting money judgments rendered by courts in other 
jurisdictions” and “would in effect . . . [allow] a further appeal on the merits . . . 
thus converting every successful multinational suit for damages into two 
suits . . . .”84  Moreover, in principle, if the foreign judicial system is 
systemically adequate, it should be able to address allegations of case-specific 
 
 79.  2005 Act § 4(b)(1).  See also ALI Act § 5(a)(i) (“[a] foreign judgment shall not be 
recognized or enforced in a court in the United States if the party resisting recognition or 
enforcement establishes that . . . the judgment was rendered under a system (whether 
national or local) that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with 
fundamental principles of fairness”); 1962 Act § 4(a)(1) (“[a] foreign judgment is not 
conclusive if . . . the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide 
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law”); 
Foreign Relations Restatement § 482(1) (“[a] court in the United States may not recognize a 
judgment of the court of a foreign state if . . . the judgment was rendered under a judicial 
system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process 
of law”). 
 80.  2005 Act § 4 cmt. 5. 
 81.  2005 Act § 4 cmt. 11. 
 82.  See 1962 Act § 4 (providing systemic but not case-specific due process exception). 
 83.  See ALI Act § 5 cmt. c. 
 84.  Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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deficiencies through procedures analogous to those that exist in the U.S. legal 
system for the same purposes—such as rehearing and appellate procedures.85  
In that sense, case-specific exceptions may be redundant to the systemic due 
process exception. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is advocating for case-
specific exceptions.86  If the judgment creditors in the Chevron-Ecuador case 
were to seek enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment in a U.S. court, whether 
a case-specific defense against enforcement is available would ordinarily 
depend on the law of foreign judgment enforcement in effect in the state where 
enforcement is sought.87  But even where a case-specific exception is 
available—for example, in 2005 Act states—Chevron probably will have little 
need to rely upon it, given the likelihood that it would be able to prove the 
applicability of the better-established systemic due process exception.88  
Moreover, other cases held out as demonstrating the need for case-specific 
exceptions—such as the judgments of Nicaraguan courts in Shell Oil Company 
v. Franco and Osorio v. Dole Food Company—would seem to be stronger 
evidence of the suitability of the traditional approach than for new case-specific 
exceptions, because in each case the judgments were found to be unenforceable 
in the United States on grounds other than the applicability of case-specific 
exceptions.89 
 
 85.  Whytock & Robertson, supra note 70, at 1502 (arguing that “[i]f . . . the [foreign] 
judiciary is systemically adequate, then the case-specific inquiry should be unnecessary at 
the enforcement stage, because [the foreign judiciary] should be able to address case-specific 
inadequacies internally, through its own rehearing r appellate processes”). 
 86.  See, e.g., WILLIAM E. THOMSON & PERLETTE MICHÈLE JURA, U.S. CHAMBER INST. 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, CONFRONTING THE NEW BREED OF TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: 
ABUSIVE FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 11 (2011) (arguing for case-specific exceptions in addition to 
systemic exception), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/doc/confronting-
the-new-breed-of-transnational-litigation-abusive-foreign-judgments. 
 87.  In the Chevron-Ecuador case, one possible wrinkle to this analysis is raised by the 
Second Circuit’s finding that Chevron is bound by Texaco’s agreement, as a condition for 
the grant of its motion to dismiss the suit in favor of the courts of Ecuador, that it would 
satisfy any judgments in plaintiffs’ favor, subject only to the exceptions in New York’s 
Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments Act.  Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron 
Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 389 (2d Cir. 2011).  On this basis, it is possible that jurisdictions other 
than New York might entertain only exceptions to enforcement recognized by the New York 
act (which do not include case-specific failures of due process). 
 88.  In proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
Judge Kaplan already has found that Chevron is likely to succeed on its claim that the 
Ecuadorian judicial system does not provide impartial tribunals and due process and that the 
systemic due process exception to enforcement therefore applies.  Chevron Corp. v. 
Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 89.  See Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, No. CV 03-8845 NM (PJWx), 2005 WL 6184247, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (denying enforcement of $489.4 million Nicaraguan judgment against 
Shell Oil); Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying 
enforcement of $97 million Nicaraguan judgment against Dole Food Co.).  See also 
THOMPSON & JURA, supra note 86, at 3 (citing the Dole case). 
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This less than satisfying connection between evidence and policy positions 
notwithstanding, the Uniform Law Commission—and the states—are moving 
in the direction of case-specific exceptions.  Breaking from the 1962 Act’s 
approach, Section 4(c) of the 2005 Act contains two new discretionary case-
specific exceptions: “[a] court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country 
judgment if . . . (7) the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise 
substantial doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the 
judgment; or (8) the specific proceeding in the foreign court leading to the 
judgment was not compatible with the requirements of due process of law.”90 
States have rapidly been adopting legislation based on the 2005 Act; today 
there are already more 2005 Act states than 1962 Act states.91 
In addition, the ALI Act includes a case-specific exception barring 
enforcement if “the judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise 
substantial and justifiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with 
respect to the judgment in question.”92  The drafters acknowledge that “[t]he 
defense of possible corruption in the rendering court is one that has not 
traditionally been an explicit ground for nonrecognition or nonenforcement by 
courts in the United States.”  But they explain that “concerns about corruption 
in the judiciaries of certain countries and the effect of corruption in the 
particular case led to inclusion of this additional defense.”93  Like the Dole and 
Shell cases before it, Chevron will surely be held out as evidence of a need to 
adopt case-specific exceptions to enforcement, but in a way that may risk 
bypassing careful evidence-based policy analysis and consideration of the 
broader implications for transnational litigation. 
To be perfectly clear, the issue here is not whether a judgment debtor 
should be required to satisfy a judgment produced by a process that is corrupt 
or violates fundamental principles of fairness.  Rather, the issue is which forum 
should determine whether a judgment was produced by such a process.  As 
with other issues relating to foreign judgment enforcement, the answer is not 
obvious.  But if a foreign legal system is systemically adequate, it should be 
able to resolve case-specific issues itself; and if it is not systemically adequate, 
then the judgment debtor could rely on the systemic due process exception.94  
 
 90.  2005 Act § 4(c)(7)-(8). 
 91.  See the figures presented supra notes 43-44. 
 92.  ALI Act § 5(a)(ii). 
 93.  ALI Act § 5 cmt. d. 
 94.  “[A] forum court might decide not to exercise its discretion to deny recognition 
despite evidence of corruption or procedural unfairness in a particular case because the party 
resisting recognition failed to raise the issue on appeal from the foreign-country judgment in 
the foreign country, and the evidence establishes that, if the party had done so, appeal would 
have been an adequate mechanism for correcting the transgressions of the lower court.”  
2005 Act § 4 cmt. 13.  This comment reinforces the sense that the case-specific exception is 
redundant—in situations where appeal would be inadequate, it would seem that the systemic 
due process exception would provide the grounds for non-enforcement. 
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Any further shift away from the traditional systemic approach and toward case-
specific approaches should be based on careful consideration of the relevant 
policies rather than driven by exceptional cases—particularly exceptional cases 
such as Shell and Dole that resulted in non-enforcement anyway, without resort 
to case-specific exceptions. 
D. Investor-State Arbitration Versus Conflict of Laws 
As noted above, in September 2009, Chevron initiated arbitration against 
the Republic of Ecuador pursuant to the Ecuador-United States BIT.95  Among 
other things, Chevron is seeking an order and award requiring Ecuador to 
inform the court in the Ecuadorian proceedings that Chevron has been released 
from liability and that Ecuador or Petroecuador is “exclusively liable for any 
judgment that may be issued in the Lago Agrio Litigation.”96  The arbitral 
tribunal has issued interim awards ordering Ecuador “to take all measures to 
suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement and recognition within and 
without Ecuador” of the Lago Agrio judgment.97  In February 2013, the 
tribunal found that Ecuador was in violation of those awards.98 
As one experienced practitioner puts it, “While we think of BIT claims as 
mechanisms whereby foreign investors can directly seek and recover damages 
from host states, the [Chevron-Ecuador] case is striking for its emphasis on 
non-monetary relief.  Indeed, its principal goal appears to be to prevent 
recognition and enforcement of any award outside Ecuador . . . [and to obtain] 
declaratory relief that Chevron and Texaco have no liability.”99  Given the 
stakes and the seriousness of Chevron’s allegations regarding the Ecuadorian 
proceedings, it is no surprise that the panel of arbitrators in the case has been 
inclined to provide this sort of relief—at least pending a final award on the 
merits. 
But there is a bigger looming policy question: Is it a good thing to make 
the investor-state arbitration system available as a mechanism for enjoining the 
enforcement of domestic court judgments?  Again, there is a risk that case-
specific imperatives may cause careful policy deliberation to be short-circuited. 
To be sure, a plausible argument might be made that, at least in some 
circumstances, investor-state arbitration should be available to block the 
enforcement of domestic court judgments.  One argument is that the existing 
 
 95.  Claimant’s Notice of Arbitration, Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petrol. Co. v. 
Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (Sept. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/EcuadorBITEn.pdf. 
 96.  Id. at 18. 
 97.  Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures, Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petrol. Co. 
v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, at 25-26 (Feb. 7, 2013), available at 
http://www.asil.org/ilib130215.cfm#j2. 
 98.  Id. at 31. 
 99.  Low, supra note 36, at 420. 
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system for judgment enforcement, which is based on a highly decentralized 
conflict-of-laws framework, can be very messy and uncertain.  A judgment 
creditor identifies a jurisdiction where the judgment debtor has assets, and 
seeks enforcement there under the judgment enforcement law of that 
jurisdiction.  In the Chevron-Ecuador case, this is already under way.  The 
judgment creditors have filed enforcement actions in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Ontario, Canada.100  What judgment debtor in Chevron’s shoes wouldn’t prefer 
a more centralized solution? 
However, there are at least two concerns that should be fully addressed 
before rushing to investor-state arbitration as a solution.  First, the arbitral 
tribunal’s order that Ecuador “take all measures at its disposal to suspend or 
cause to be suspended the enforcement or recognition within and without 
Ecuador of any judgment against [Chevron] in the Lago Agrio Case”101 
obviously has an adverse impact on the judgment creditors—the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs.  Yet the Lago Agrio plaintiffs are not parties to the arbitral 
proceedings.  In its Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the 
arbitral tribunal noted the Monetary Gold principle, according to which a 
tribunal should not exercise jurisdiction if the decision would determine the 
rights and obligations of a non-party, but held that it was not applicable.102  
Thus, parties who will be directly and seriously affected by the arbitral 
tribunal’s decision are not parties to the process that could determine the fate of 
the judgment under which they are beneficiaries.  Second, as Ralph Steinhardt 
has argued, arbitral awards ordering a state to suspend enforcement of a 
judgment issued by one of its courts would seem to be in tension with 
principles of judicial independence.103  As a matter of general policy, would 
the United States, for example, be comfortable with a system where, pursuant 
to an investor-state arbitral award, the United States may be required to nullify 
a decision of its independent judicial branch?  As Steinhardt argues, this 
concern may be especially acute when a domestic court’s judgment is 
implementing other obligations of states, such as international human rights 
obligations.104  One might argue that this isn’t what’s happening in the 
Chevron-Ecuador case—but that itself would highlight the need to be cautious 
about proposals for legal change that are driven by alleged facts in a particular 
case but not necessarily sensible from a more general policy perspective. 
My point is not that the existing conflict-of-laws system is ideal, and my 
point is not that there categorically should not be a role for the investor-state 
arbitration system in the realm of judgment enforcement.  But there is reason 
 
 100.  Webber, supra note 30. 
 101.  Order for Interim Measures (Feb. 9, 2011) at 3; First Award on Interim Measures 
(Jan. 25, 2012) at 16. 
 102.  Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 4.60 (Feb. 27, 2012). 
 103.  Ralph G. Steinhardt, Remarks, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 422, 422 (2013). 
 104.  Id. 
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for skepticism.  The risk is that a movement in this direction in the Chevron-
Ecuador case may be driven by case-specific imperatives rather than objective 
general policy analysis with widespread participation by different affected 
constituencies, and that this use of investor-state arbitration would nevertheless 
become a new model for avoiding judgments. 
CONCLUSION 
If Chevron’s factual allegations about the Ecuadorian proceedings are 
correct, it would not very easy to get comfortable with an outcome whereby the 
Ecuadorian judgment would be enforced.  The facts alleged by Chevron push 
forcefully toward non-enforcement.  This push toward a particular outcome 
based on the allegations in this particular case puts pressure on the law and on 
legal decision-makers on each of the four issues discussed in this Essay: the 
fraud exception, the relationship between forum non conveniens and judgment 
enforcement, the scope of the due process exception, and the relationship 
between investor-state arbitration and judgment enforcement. 
Given the stakes and the allegations, combined with Chevron’s skilled, 
aggressive, and well-funded legal team, there is a significant chance that the 
Chevron-Ecuador case will produce, and may already have produced, 
significant change in the law of transnational litigation.  But it is far from clear 
that this is a good thing for the law of transnational litigation in general.  In any 
event, existing defenses against enforcement—including the systemic due 
process exception—may already provide a basis for the outcome Chevron is 
seeking, so legal change may be unnecessary even from its perspective.  
Indeed, this is surely one reason why the plaintiffs have not sought enforcement 
in the United States. 
Thus, while the Chevron-Ecuador case usefully illustrates significant 
transnational litigation trends, its lessons for legal change are, and should be, 
limited.  As Chief Justice Roberts has argued: “Extreme cases often test the 
bounds of established legal principles. There is a cost to yielding to the desire 
to correct the extreme case, rather than adhering to the legal principle. That cost 
has been demonstrated so often that it is captured in a legal aphorism: ‘Hard 
cases make bad law.’”105  Hard cases also risk making bad policy.  This risk 
would seem to be especially great when the stakes are extremely high and the 
 
 105.  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 899 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  “Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not 
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some 
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the 
judgment.” N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
Cf. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 403 (3d ed. 2011) 
(explaining that the phrase “hard cases make bad law” “refers to the danger that a decision 
operating harshly on the defendant may lead a court to make an unwarranted exception or 
otherwise alter the law”). 
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alleged facts are as serious as they are in the Chevron-Ecuador case.  Of course, 
the lawyers for the parties in this dispute need to represent their clients 
appropriately.  But to avoid inappropriately “Chevronizing” the law of 
transnational litigation, judges, scholars and policymakers should be cautious 
about drawing lessons from the case about desirable directions for law reform. 
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